SECURITIES

DOCTRINE
REGULATION-SALE-OF-BuSINESS
DOES NOT EXEMPT SALE OF 100% OF CORPORATE STOCK

ACTs-Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985); Gould v.

FROM PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL SECURITIES

Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 19342 apply to all transactions involving the sale or purchase
of a security.3 Nevertheless, despite the broad definitions of the
term "security" contained in the two Acts,4 the sale-of-business
doctrine restricted the coverage of the securities laws. 5 More specifically, this doctrine excluded transactions involving the sale of
100% of a corporation's stock from the requirements of the two
Securities Acts. 6 The doctrine justified this result by viewing the
sale of 100% of the stock of a corporation as the sale of a business rather than the sale of stock.7 Thus, the doctrine focused on
the economic reality of the transaction and allowed the courts to
exclude total stock sales from the statutory definition of a security. 8 Recently, however, in the companion cases of Landreth Tim1 Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1933 Act].
2 Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1934 Act].
3 See supra notes 1-2.
4 See 1933 Act, tit. 1, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (definition of security);
1934 Act, tit. 1, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (definition of security). The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" as follows:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires(1) The term security means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities . . . or any put, call, straddle, option, or

privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency. . . or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 1933
Act's and the 1934 Act's definitions of "security" are essentially identical. Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982) (citation omitted).
5 See, e.g., Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 443-44 (10th Cir. 1977).
6 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
7 See id. at 1352.
8 See id.
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ber Co. v. Landreth9 and Gould v. Ruefenacht,' the United States
Supreme Court rejected the limitation of the sale-of-business
doctrine and held that the securities laws apply to all transactions
involving the transfer of traditional stock."
The facts of Landreth centered on the sale of 100% of a lumber business. 12 Ivan Landreth and his sons were the operators
and the sole shareholders of this lumber business, which was located in Washington. 3 They decided to make an offering of their
shares through local and out-of-state stockbrokers. 14 Upon hearing of the Landreths' decision to sell their company's stock, Samuel Dennis, a tax attorney from Massachusetts representing a
small group of investors, negotiated a stock purchase agreement
with the Landreths.' 5 Landreth demanded that the deal be in the
form of a sale of stock rather than a sale of assets.' 6 Consequently, Dennis and his investors formed B & D Co. solely for the
purpose of acquiring the stock of the lumber company.' 7 B & D
Co. then merged with the lumber company to form Landreth
Timber Co., the plaintiff.'8
Dennis and John Bolten, his principal partner, arranged for
an audit and an inspection of the lumber mill.' 9 They offered
Landreth a job as manager of the mill, but Landreth declined. 0
9

105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).

10 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).

11 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2303; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2310. The Court stated,
"[W]e think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition of 'security' to
hold that the traditional stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage." Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2303. The term "traditional stock" means any "[s]ecurities
which represent an ownership interest in a corporation." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1270 (5th ed. 1979); see also United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851
(1975) (Court identified characteristics usually associated with common stock as
right to receive dividends, negotiability, ability to be pledged or hypothecated, voting rights, and the ability to appreciate in value).
12 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2300-01.
'3 Id. at 2300.
14 Id. A portion of the company's sawmill was destroyed by fire before a deal was
consummated. Id. The brokers continued the offering, however, informing prospective purchasers of the fire damage and the Landreths' intention to rebuild. See
id.
15 See id. at 2300-01. The group, none of whom had any knowledge of the lumber business, purchased the business on the basis of predictions of future profits
and anticipated earnings. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348,
1350 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
16 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 2297 (1985).
17 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2301.
18 Id.

19 See id. at 2300-01.
20 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
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When the lumber mill turned out to be unprofitable, Dennis and
Bolten sold it at a loss, went into receivership, and sought rescission of the stock sale and damages of $2.5 million. 2 ' The basis
for their suit was that Landreth had offered and sold the stock
without first registering it-a violation of the Federal securities
laws.22
Landreth moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
Federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the
stock of a closely held corporation.23 The district court granted
the motion.24 Although the court found that the Landreth stock
had all of the usual characteristics of stock, it held that under the
sale-of-business doctrine, the plaintiff had not purchased a "security" within the meaning of the securities laws. 25 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court.2 6 Viewing the underlying transaction of the sale of the
Landreth stock as the sale of an entire business, the court applied
the sale-of-business doctrine and found that the transaction did
not fall within the statutory definition of a "security. 27
The Ruefenacht case involved a purchase by Max Ruefenacht
of 50% of the stock in Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of spirits and wines.28 Ruefenacht purchased this large
share of the corporation in reliance on financial reports and oral
representations made by Joachim Birkle, the president and former sole owner of Continental.2 9 Part of the consideration for
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). A full-time manager was hired, and Landreth signed a
twelve-month consulting agreement, which was terminable at the will of either
party on 30 days' notice. Id.
21 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2301. The losses resulted in part because the rebuilding costs were higher than estimated and the new equipment was incompatible with the existing mill components. See id.; see also supra note 14 (mill was rebuilt
because of fire damage prior to sale).
22 See Landreth, 105 S.Ct. at 2301. The petitioner also claimed that the respondents had made negligent or intentional misrepresentations and had omitted material facts about their lumber business in violation of the 1934 Act. Id.
23 See id. More specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the "[r]espondents
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the transaction was not covered
by the Acts because under the so-called 'sale of business' doctrine, petitioner had
not purchased a 'security' within the meaning of those Acts." Id.
24 Id. The opinion of the district court was unpublished. See id.
25 See id.
26 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
27 Id.
28 See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 321 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S.Ct. 2308 (1985).
29 See id.
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the sale was Ruefenacht's promise to participate in the company's
management.30 Ruefenacht also worked full-time for another
corporation, however.' After paying part of the purchase price
of the stock, Ruefenacht started to doubt the accuracy of some of
the representations Birkle had made to him.32 Eventually, he filed
suit, alleging various violations of the Securities Acts.33
The lower court granted summary judgment for the defendants and held that "the stock purchased by Ruefenacht was not a
'security' within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts." 3 4
Although the court found that the stock Ruefenacht purchased
possessed all the indicia of a security, it held that the Securities
Acts did not apply because of the control Ruefenacht exerted
over Continental's business.35 On appeal, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and held that this stock fell within the
plain language of the statutory definition of the term "security."' 36 Accordingly, the court refused to uphold the sale-of-busi-

ness doctrine in situations concerning stock sales.37
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Landreth 3' and
Ruefenacht 39 cases in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits over whether the sale of a substantial amount of the stock of
a closely held corporation is covered by the antifraud provisions
of the Securities Acts.40 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected
the sale-of-business doctrine and held that "stock" is "in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope of the Acts'
definition of 'security.' "41
The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts define the term "security" as including a number of specific items such as stocks and
30

See id. at 321-22.

31

Id. at 322.

id.
See id. Ruefenacht "alleg[ed] violations of sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1982), section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10(b)(5) (1983)." Id.
34 Id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 338-39.
37 See id. at 338.
38 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
39 Gould v. Ruefenacht, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
40 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984)
(recognizing that Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits accept sale-of-business
doctrine while Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits reject it), rev'd, 105
S. Ct. 229,7 (1985).
41 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306.
32 See
33
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bonds, as well as less easily characterized instruments such as investment contracts. 42 The Supreme Court first attempted to define the broad scope of the term "security" in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.4" The instruments examined in Howey were agreements for
the sale of citrus land tracts offered with accompanying, optional
service contracts. 4" The Court held that these transactions involved the sale of an "investment contract, '45 which it defined as
"an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others."'4 6 This definition, com-

monly known as the Howey test, determines whether the term "investment contract" applies to an instrument, thus rendering the
instrument a "security" within the meaning of the Securities
Acts. 4 7 This open-ended categorization provided by the Howey
decision has permitted courts to interpret the term "security"
broadly for purposes of the Securities Acts. 48 Today, Howey and
related decisions stand for the principle that the substance or
economic reality of the transaction may justify application of the
Securities Acts even when the instrument involved is not a "traditional" security.4"
Questions have also arisen concerning whether items listed
as "securities" in the definitional sections of the Securities Acts
should nevertheless be exempted from coverage under certain
circumstances. 50 These questions were squarely addressed by
the Supreme Court in United Housing Foundationv. Forman.5 ' Forman involved the purchase of shares of nonprofit stock in Riverbay Corporation, a company that owned and operated a low52
income housing project in New York City known as Co-op City.
Prospective tenants were required to purchase stock in order to
42 See supra note 4; see also SEC v. C.M.Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 35055 (1943) (first attempt by the Court to define "investment contract").
43 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

44

See id. at 295.

See id. at 299-300.
Id. at 301.
47 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 815 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 802 (1986);
Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756
F.2d 230, 238 (2d Cir. 1985) (all discussing the Howey test).
48 See Note, The Second Circuit Rejects the Sale of Business Doctrine, 57 TUL. L. REV.
715, 717 (1983).
49 See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (citations
omitted).
50 See, e.g,, id. at 849-50.
51 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
52 Id. at 840-42.
45
46
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obtain apartments in the project.53 When increased construction
costs caused increases in maintenance costs, the tenants sued.5 4
In their complaint, the tenants alleged violations of the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Acts. 55
The district court dismissed the suit and held that the use of
the label "stock" did not bring a nonsecurity transaction within
the scope of the Federal securities acts. 56 The district court analyzed the underlying transaction using the Howey test and found
that the nonprofit nature of these instruments removed them
from the Howey definition of "investment contracts. 57 Subsequently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's determination and applied a literal approach to the
words of the Acts.58 The Second Circuit held that if the word
"stock" were used in a purchase offering, then the transaction
automatically fell within the definition of the Securities Acts.59
On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision.6" The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court's literal approach and held that the name
given to an instrument did not automatically determine its character."' The Court reasoned that if the shares of a security have
none of the elements that ordinarily characterize stock in our
commercial world, 62 then they are not stock simply because they
are so labeled.63 The shares in Riverbay were found to have none
of the characteristics usually associated with common stock;
therefore, the Court held that they were not stock for purposes of
Id. at 842.
See id. at 843-44.
55 See id. at 844-45 & n.8. The plaintiffs claimed that the 1965 Co-op City information bulletin made false representations as to cost increases and "failed to disclose several critical facts." Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). Based on these charges,
the plaintiffs asserted two claims under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934
Act. Id. at 844-45.
56 See Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1126-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United Hous. Found. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
57 See id. at 1128-32.
58 See Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252, 1257 (2d Cir.
1974), rev'd sub nom. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
59 See id.at 1252. The Second Circuit also observed that a possible sharing of
Riverbay's income and tax benefits could constitute an "expectation of profits" sufficient to fulfill the profit element of Howey's investment contract definition. See id.
at 1254.
60 Forman, 421 U.S. at 847.
61 See id.at 850.
62 See supra note 11 (listing ordinary characteristics of stock).
63 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 851.
53
54
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the Securities Acts. 64
The Supreme Court then examined the shares in Riverbay to
determine whether an "investment contract" was involved-as
defined by the Howey test-which would implicate the provisions
of the Securities Acts. 6 5 The Court found the transaction underlying the sale of Riverbay shares to be the purchase of subsidized,
low-cost living space, not an investment for profit. 6 6 Hence, the
Court reasoned that the transaction involved no expectation of
profit, that the transaction did not involve the sale of a security,
and that the antifraud provisions of the Acts were inapplicable.6 7
Subsequently, many courts interpreted Forman as providing
that before the Securities Acts can be considered applicable, all
68
sales of stock should be subjected to an economic reality test.
The purpose of such a test would be to determine whether a particular purchase of securities constituted an investment "premised on a reasonable expectation of profits."6 9 These courts
rejected a literal approach to securities law on the theory that
while some instruments may be within the letter of the Securities
Acts, they should escape their coverage because they fail to fall
70
within the true spirit of the Acts.
The sale-of-business doctrine soon developed from this rationale. 71 The reasoning behind this doctrine is that the Securi72
ties Acts were designed to protect investors, not entrepreneurs.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 851-59. The Court restated the Howey test and focused on whether
the purchaser had "a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852.
66 See id. at 853.
67 See id. at 858-59.
68 See, e.g., Christison v. Groen, 740 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1984); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-45 (11 th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Sons, 654 F.2d 459,
465 (7th Cir. 1981).
69 See Canfield v. Rapp & Sons, 654 F.2d 459, 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1981) (interpreting Forman as indicating that economic reality test is fundamental way of defining any type of security).
70 See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (citing Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981).
71 See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
72 See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982). The Sutter court noted
that
we . . .must ask whether the sale of 100 percent of the common stock
of [the corporation] was the kind of transaction that Congress, if it had
foreseen the promulgation of Rule lOb-5, would have wanted brought
within its scope. We must ask . . . what class of people Congress
wanted to protect by enacting the Securities Exchange Act. . . .The
answer is not in doubt: investors. In his message to Congress. . .Presi-
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Because the sale of 100% of the stock in a closely held corporation is really the transfer of all of the assets and control of the
corporation, the purchaser is not a passive investor, but an entrepreneur.73 Therefore, he is not a member of the class to which
the Securities Acts afford protection."4
The transaction in Forman was excluded from the Securities
Acts because it was found to be the sale of apartment space, not
the sale of a passive investment in stock. 7 5 The sale-of-business
doctrine applies this same reasoning to exclude transactions that
encompass the sale of an entire business. 6 Because something
other than a passive investment is being sold, the transaction
cannot properly be considered the sale of a security, according to
the sale-of-business doctrine.7 7
Forman thus spawned two different methods for interpreting
the coverage of the Securities Acts. 7 ' The literal method posits
that if something possesses the traditional attributes of stock or
some other security, then the Securities Acts apply.79 In contrast,
the economic reality method requires an inquiry into the substance of each transaction before the Securities Acts will be
deemed applicable.8 0 In the 1981 case of Frederiksen v. Poloway,s t
dent Roosevelt recommended "the enactment of legislation providing
for the . . . protection of investors .... ." The Report of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency [also] describes the objective of
the legislation as [protecting investors]. . . . No other protected class is
mentioned; entrepreneurs are not mentioned ...
There is a clear difference in principle between an investor and an
entrepreneur; and while sometimes a person is both at once, often he is
one or the other.
Id.
73 See Christison v. Groen, 740 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1984). The court stated
that "[a] purchaser who contracts to buy an entire business with the intent to operate and control that business is in a position quite different from investors who buy
stock in businesses about which they may know nothing other than the information
they get from the businesses or investment managers." Id.
74 See id.
75 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 853.
76 See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982).
77 See id.
78 See generally Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a
TransactionalContext-Based Analysis for FederalSecuritiesJurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAw. 929,
937-44 (1984) (detailed analysis of literal and economic reality methods for interpreting coverage of Securities Acts).
79 See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 23 (1984); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d
Cir. 1982).
80 See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp &
Sons, 654 F.2d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1981).
81 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
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the Seventh Circuit followed the economic reality method and
held that the sale of 100% of the stock and assets of a marina was
not within the purview of the Securities Acts. 82
In Frederiksen, the purchaser asserted control over the critical
decisions of the corporation and did not merely place investment
capital in the hands of someone else.13 The Frederiksen court reasoned that the purpose of the Acts was to protect the passive investor rather than the commercial purchaser and operator.8 4 To
implement this view, the court emphasized the limiting language
in the definitional sections of both of the Securities Acts, which
provide that an instrument will be considered a security " 'unless
the context otherwise requires.' "85 The court read this limitation as mandating an evaluation of the economic substance of the
particular transaction in question 8 6 Reasoning that the underlying transaction in Frederiksen was entrepreneurial rather than investment-oriented, the court held that the transaction did not
8 7
involve a security because the context required otherwise.
Golden v. Garafalo,8 ' decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1982, represents an application of the literal method
for interpreting the coverage of the Securities Acts.89 Golden involved a stock purchase of 100% of a ticket brokerage business. 90
The Golden court held that conventional corporate stock is a security for purposes of the Securities Acts regardless of whether
the sale is to a purchaser who intends to manage the business. 9 '
See id. at 1148.
See id. at 1153.
84 See id. at 1150.
85 See id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1982)); see also supra note 4 (discussing
definitional sections of the Securities Acts).
86 Frederiksen, 637 F.2d at 1150. The Third Circuit in Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran,
however, rejected this interpretation. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320,
330-32 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).
The court stated that this type of "context clause" precedes all of the definitional
clauses in both Acts and is not directed particularly at the definition of a "security."
See id. at 330. The court further observed that the language "unless the context
otherwise requires" was substituted for "unless the text otherwise indicates" and
refers to the text of the statute itself, not to the context of the transaction. Id. at
330-31.
87 See Frederiksen, 637 F.2d at 1150-54. The court found additional support for
this interpretation in the Forman decision, which held that an instrument that fits
the literal-but not the substantive-definition of a "security" will escape the ambit
of the Securities Acts. See id. at 1150 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 849).
88 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
89 See id. at 1146.
90 Id. at 1140.
82
83

91 See id.
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The primary issue was whether the Forman decision had adopted
the Howey economic reality test in all cases determining the scope
or applicability of the securities laws. 9 2 The Golden majority reasoned that it had not.9" Instead, the Golden court held that instruments bearing both the label "stock" and the traditional
attributes of stock are automatically covered by the Securities
Acts.9 4 The court opined that an economic reality test was necessary only if the instrument in question was not labeled "stock"
95
and did not possess the traditional attributes of stock.
In its analysis, the Golden majority noted that the Supreme
Court had historically focused on the nature of the instrument
rather than the nature of the transaction.9 6 The Golden court then
observed that the general application of Howey's economic reality
test would render meaningless the specific definitions in the Securities Acts such as "stocks" and "bonds."9 7 The court stated
that this result would follow from the test's requirement that
each instrument be analyzed in the general terms of an "investment contract."9 " Surely, the Golden court reasoned, the drafters
of the Securities Acts listed instruments other than investment
contracts in the Acts' definitional sections precisely to avoid application of the economic reality test to all securities
transactions .99
Finally, the court voiced its distaste for the judicial practice
of distinguishing commercial transactions from investment trans92

See id. at 1143-44.

93 See id. at 1144.
94 See id.
95

See id. The court stated:
There was little reason for the drafters [of the Securities Acts] to use
words such as "stock," "treasury stock" or "voting-trust certificate", unless their intention was to include all such instruments as commonly defined. If an "economic reality" test were intended, reference to such
specific types of instruments, and common variations of them, would
have been inappropriate because a substantial portion of each class of
instrument would, in fact, not be within the definition. We believe that
Congress intended to draft an expansive definition and to include with
specificity all instruments with characteristics agreed upon in the commercial world. . . . Catch-all phrases such as "investment contract,"
were then included to cover unique instruments not easily classified. If
the "economic reality" test were to be the core of the definition, only
general catch-all terms would have been used.

Id.
96 See id.
97 See id.

98 See id.
99 See id.
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actions as a method for identifying situations involving "securities. '"100

The court found such a distinction to be of dubious

value and unworkable.' 0 ' Hence, the Second Circuit rejected the
sale-of-business doctrine and held that Forman did not require
the application of Howey's economic reality test to conventional
02
stock transactions. 1

In Landreth and Ruefenacht, the Supreme Court settled the
conflict among the circuits regarding which approach for determining the character of a "security"-the economic reality approach or the literal approach-best represented the basic tenets
of the Forman decision.10 3 In refusing to apply the sale-of-business doctrine, the Supreme Court clarified the Forman analysis as
a two-part test requiring an inquiry into the economic realities of
the transaction only if the security in question did not possess the
traditional characteristics of one of the specific securities listed in
10 4
the definitional sections of the Securities Acts.
In its Landreth opinion, the Supreme Court first addressed
the definitional sections of the Securities Acts and recognized
that "stock" was generally considered a security for the purposes
of the statutes.'0 5 The Court explained that "the label 'stock' is
not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts"; instead, the instruments at issue must "possess 'some of the significant characteristics typically associated with' stock."' 6 The
Landreth Court noted that the first part of the Forman "security"
identification test is to determine whether something that is
called stock is indeed stock.'0 7 In Forman, the Court observed, the
stock in question failed this first part of the test because it lacked
the characteristics typically associated with stock.' 08 In Landreth,
however, the Court found that the instrument at issue possessed
"all of the characteristics

. . .

identified in Forman as traditionally

associated with common stock."' 0

9

The Court opined that be-

00 See id. at 1146. The Golden court disagreed with the Frederiksen court's decision
that an essentially commercial transaction is not a transaction involving "securities." Id. at 1140-41 (citations omitted). The Golden majority believed that the criteria for application of the sale-of-business doctrine are unclear and that they result
in unnecessary case-by-case determinations. See id. at 1145.
101 See id. at 1146.
102 See id. at 1144.
103 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2304; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2310.
104 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302-03; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2310.
105 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302.
106 Id. (citation omitted).
107 See id. at 2304.
108 See id.
109) Id. at 2302-03.
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cause an investor in these instruments would believe he was covered by the securities laws and because the legislative purpose of
the Securities Acts was to protect investors, the traditional stock
at issue here was within the scope of the Acts' coverage.0
The Court also clarified the second half of the Forman test
and, in so doing, verified the literalist interpretation of Forman."l
The Court explained that the second level of analysis in Forman
was necessary only because the stock in that case did not possess
the ordinary characteristics of stock."I2 This analysis, the Landreth
Court maintained, involved a determination by the Forman Court
of whether the economic realities of the transaction at issue justified the application of the securities laws.' 13 As the Landreth majority noted, the Forman Court found that they did not." 4
In contrast, the Landreth Court viewed the stock at issue in
that case as "traditional stock, plainly within the statutory definition."' ' 5 The Landreth majority stated that when this is the situation, further analysis of the economic reality of the transaction is
unnecessary." 6 Only if the first part of the Forman analysis is not
met, the Landreth Court reasoned, is inquiry into the substance of
the transaction necessary or proper." 7 Hence, it is only unusual
instruments, not easily characterized as securities, that are subjected to the economic reality test set forth in Forman." 8
The Landreth Court offered several reasons for confining the
economic reality test to cases involving unusual instruments.
Specifically, the majority set forth the following three important
justifications: statutory construction," 9 the necessity for uniformity and predictability, 20 and the expectations of most investors that their stock transactions would be protected by the
110 See id. at 2303.
I 1 See id. at 2303-05.

112 See id. at 2302. The Court noted that the shares in Forman lacked the right to
receive dividends, they were nonnegotiable, they could not be pledged or hypothecated, they conferred no voting rights, and they could not appreciate in value. Id.
at 2302 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 851).
113 See id. at 2303-04 (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 301).
114 See id. at 2304 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 858).
115 Id.
116 See id. The Court stated, "There is no need here, as there was in the prior
cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether
the Acts apply." Id.
117 See id.
118 See id. at 2305.
119 See id. at 2304-05.
120 See id. at 2306-08.
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securities laws. 2 ' Initially, the Landreth Court recognized that
both specific terms and general catch-all phrases were listed in
the definitional sections of the Securities Acts. 12 2 The Court reasoned that the economic reality test of Howey is designed to apply
only to one of the more general catch-all phrases-namely, investment contracts. 123 If it were necessary to subject all of the
Securities Acts' definitional terms to the Howey test, the Landreth
majority opined, then the enumeration of specific terms such as
"stock" would be superfluous.' 2 4
Finally, the Landreth Court rejected the interpretation that
the plain language of the Securities Acts exclusively applies to
passive investors.' 25 The Court determined that the language of
the Acts applies, by its terms, to all transactions in securities and
not merely to investment transactions or public offerings. 12 6 Furthermore, the Court stated that even though the Acts exempt
nonpublic offerings from their registration provisions, they do
12 7
not exempt such offerings from their antifraud provisions.
The Landreth majority concluded that, barring a specific statutory
exemption, the language of the Acts offers no support for the
sale-of-business doctrine's distinction between commercial purchasers and investors. 128 Accordingly, the Court refused to recognize the sale-of-business doctrine as legitimate law in the field
29
of securities. '
For the same reasons that it reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Landreth, the Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit's
121
122
123
124

See
See
See
Id.

id. at 2306.
id. at 2302 (citation omitted).
id. at 2304.
at 2305 (citing Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144).

125 See id.
126 See id.

127 See id. For a brief analysis of whether there is a distinction between the definition of a security for the registration and disclosure provisions and the definition of
a security for the antifraud provisions, see Seldin, When Stock Is Nvot a Security: The
"Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637, 638 n.3
(1982).
128 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2305.
129 See id. at 2308. The Court also noted two important policy reasons for its
rejection of the sale-of-business doctrine: the purchasers of these securities apparently had no intention of managing the purchased corporation, and application of
the doctrine to transactions in stock might lead to confusion in the securities laws.
See id. at 2307. The Court stated that "if applied to this case, the sale of business
doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This inevitably would lead to difficult questions of line-drawing." Id.
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determination of Ruefenacht. 130 Reasoning that the "stock" in
Ruefenacht was a "security" within the definitional sections of the
Securities Acts' 3 ' and refusing to apply the sale-of-business doctrine to this transaction, the Court stated that the "[aipplication
of the sale of business doctrine

. . .

would lead to arbitrary dis-

tinctions between transactions covered by the Acts and those that
are not."' 3 2' The Court observed that the purpose of the Securities Acts was to protect investors. 33 Therefore, because the
plaintiff was an investor as well as an entrepreneur, there was no
compelling reason to refrain from applying the provisions of the
Acts to this sale of corporate stock.' 3 4
Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion, dissenting from
both the Landreth and Ruefenacht decisions. 35 Justice Stevens
viewed the purpose of the Securities Acts to be the protection of
the investor trading in a public market "who is not in a position
to negotiate appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on
access to inside information before consummating the transaction." 136 The cases before the Court, Justice Stevens noted, were
not of this sort. 137 Instead, they were brought by buyers who
were in a position to obtain appropriate warranties, to evaluate
independently the information
received from the sellers, and to
38
negotiate favorable terms.

Furthermore, Justice Stevens considered the sale of a closely
held corporation, whether through the form of a sale of assets or
a sale of stock, to be a matter of interest only to the parties involved. 1 39 He reasoned that the parties to the transfer of com-

pany control can negotiate a deal designed to compensate for the
added liabilities acquired through the sale of stock.140 Justice Stevens thus posited that this kind of transaction falls " 'far outside
the scope of the legislature's concern,' " and he believed that the
Court should not expand liability under the Securities Acts be130

See Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2310.

131 Id.
132 See id. at 2311; see also supra note 129 (identical objection to sale-of-business
doctrine raised in Landreth).
133 Ruefenacht, 105 S.Ct. at 2311.
134 See id.
135 See Landreth, 105 S.Ct. at 2312 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 See id.

138 See id.

139 See id.
140 See id.
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yond the scope intended by Congress.' 4 ' In addition, Justice Stevens viewed the expansive reading of the Acts' coverage as a
usurpation of state authority. 142 He stated "that [the] Court
should presume that federal legislation is not intended to displace state authority
unless Congress has plainly indicated an in143
tent to do so.'

The Supreme Court's decisions in Landreth and Ruefenacht
are supported by strong policies. Quite properly, the Court acknowledged that the definition of a security should be universal
and predictable 44 and that the sale-of-business doctrine, while
straightforward in theory, often leads to difficulties when applied
in particular situations. 145 Lower courts have recognized the inherent difficulty in defining the exact scope of the sale-of-business exception. 46 One distinct problem is the determination of
whether corporate control has been transferred and, in turn,
whether the transaction involves the sale of a business and not
just a passive investment in stock. 1 47 As the Landreth Court recognized, even the transfer of 100% of a corporation's stock may
not transfer control.1 48 In fact, in Landreth itself, it was not clear
that the transfer of 100% of the Landreth stock transferred control of the lumber company to the plaintiffs.' 49 The Landreth
majority found it significant that Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill themselves and that Ivan Landreth
had apparently signed on to manage the daily affairs of the business. 50 The difficulties in determining whether corporate control has actually been transferred and whether the new owner is
participating in an active capacity or as a passive investor makes
the application of the sale-of-business doctrine uncertain. 1 5 ' Furthermore, this fact undermines the value of the doctrine's com141 See id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
142 See id. at 2313 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens failed to explain,
however, how the majority's decisions would usurp state authority. See id.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 2305-06.
145 See id. at 2307.
146 See Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2311 & n.2 (citations omitted).
147 See id.at 2310-11.
148 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id. The Landreth majority noted that "the District Court was required to
undertake extensive fact-finding, and even requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the case." Id. (citation
omitted).
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mercial purchaser/investment purchaser dichotomy. 152
Conversely, in some cases, control of a corporation may be
transferred through a purchase of significantly less than 100% of
the corporation's stock.15 3 As the court of appeals in Ruefenacht
recognized, the sale-of-business doctrine should be equally applicable to all cases involving the transfer of corporate control, regardless of whether the transaction involves the purchase of 15%
of the stock or 100%.'1 4 Accordingly, the determination of
whether corporate control has passed in a given case is often a
difficult task.' 55 In determining transfers of corporate control,
courts may have to consider such factors as the strength of minority shareholder factions, voting patterns, and management involvement.156 This pre-transaction uncertainty regarding
whether a block of stock constitutes a "controlling interest" or
merely a "security" may have real economic costs, and it is
clearly contrary
to the goal of uniformity that underlies the secur57
1
ities laws.

A problem of mutuality also results when courts base the application of the Securities Acts on whether a particular transaction has actually transferred control in a company. The
Ruefenacht Court recognized that under the sale-of-business doctrine, an instrument might be deemed a security as to one party
to the transaction, but not as to the other. 15 The idea that application of the Securities Acts might turn on the litigant's interest
in the transaction is inimical to the Acts' primary purpose of investor protection, and the Ruefenacht majority acknowledged this
159
fact in declining to apply the sale-of-business doctrine.
See id.
153 See id.
154 See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 332 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985); see also Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197,
203 (7th Cir. 1982) (presumption of entrepreneurial objective arises when the purchaser obtains more than 50% of the shares of the business).
155 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2311.
156 See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 332 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).
157 See id.
158 See Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2311. For example, the Court stated,
[Alithough the sale of all a corporation's stock to a single buyer by a
single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security under the
sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a single
buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but not
as to the buyer.
Id. at 2311 n.2.
159 See id. at 2311.
152
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The Court's most significant reason for rejecting the sale-ofbusiness doctrine was its belief that application of the securities
laws "to the sale of stock at issue [in Landreth] comport[ed] with
Congress' remedial purpose in enacting the legislation."' 6' The
Court recognized that the drafters of the Acts did not intend that
all commercial stock transactions be covered, nor that there be a
broad Federal remedy for all types of fraud.' 6 ' Nevertheless, the
Court properly noted that the drafters did intend to protect the
investor by regulating investment transactions.' 62 The Acts not
only require full disclosure to protect securities buyers, but provide remedies when this dufy is not satisfied. 63 Consequently,
the Acts fundamentally alter the responsibilities of buyers and
sellers of investments.
Indeed, Congress recognized that securities investors were
vulnerable to fraud and overreaching and concluded that the securities sales transaction should be regulated by requiring full
and accurate informational disclosure." 6 Although the Acts appear to involve the Government in what are essentially private
business negotiations, Congress believed such intervention was
necessary to strengthen the bargaining position of the ordinary
investor. 165 In addition, through passage of the Securities Acts,
Congress sought to facilitate commerce, to reduce transaction
costs, and to enhance the free flow of capital.166 Therefore, the
Court correctly determined that broad coverage by the Acts
would best serve the Congressional purpose underlying the Se67
curities Acts. 1
The Court was careful to point out that the Landreth and
Ruefenacht decisions were limited to the determination of whether
See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2303.
Id.; see also id. at 2306 n.7.
162 See id. at 2303.
163 Id. Of course, one can argue that the Acts do more than simply protect buyers; in fact, some authors have argued that the Acts afford buyers an unfair advantage. See Blenke, FederalSecurity Laws and Their Applicability to the Sale of a Business: An
Appeal for Regulatory Action, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 393, 412 (1984). One such unfair
advantage is that an unscrupulous purchaser can use the antifraud provisions to
recover for undisclosed factors he knew or should have known. Id.
164 See Easley, supra note 78, at 966-67 & n.277 (noting that SEC specifically
stated that rule lOb-5 was necessary to protect investors).
165 See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 333 (3d Cir. 1984) (in providing
for regulation of widely-recognized instruments, "Congress reduced the transaction costs associated with their transfer"), aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S.
Ct. 2308 (1985).
166 See id.
167 See Landreth, 105 S.Ct. at 2307 n.7.
160
161
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or not traditional "stock" is a security for the purposes of the
Securities Acts. 16 8 In fact, the Landreth majority stated, "We here
expressly leave until another day the questions whether 'notes' or
'bonds' or some other category of instrument listed in the definition might be shown 'by proving [only] the document itself.' "169
Hence, although the Court recognized that there are instruments
other than stock "whose names alone carry well-settled meaning[s],"'-7 it declined to create a presumption that these instruments are covered by the Acts merely because of their labels.' 7 '
Instead, the Court distinguished stock as being a unique category
to which application of the plain language of the Securities Acts
is both the beginning and the end of the inquiry. 7 2 As a result,
the Court has apparently preserved the economic reality test as
the primary method for identifying securities in all but the most
obvious cases.
This retention of the economic reality test is well-advised.
Although the Landreth Court limits the economic reality analysis
to somewhat unusual instruments, it is clear that such analysis is
an indispensable tool in determining the character of items other
than stock. 173 Clearly, there is no traditional note or traditional
certificate of deposit in the same sense that there is traditional
stock. 1 7 4 Therefore, the Court's use of a strict statutory analysis
is useful only as applied to stock, and the economic reality test
remains important for construing the other terms in the definitional sections of the Securities Acts.
One question that remains unanswered is whether the LanSee id. at 2306; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2310.
Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306 (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
170 Id. at 2302.
171 See id. at 2306. The Court further stated, "We recognize that in Voiner], the
Court equated 'notes' and 'bonds' with 'stock' as categories listed in the statutory
definition that were standardized enough to rest on their names. . . . Nonetheless,
in Forman, we characterized Joiner's language as dictum." Id. (citing Forman, 421
U.S. at 850; SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
172 See id.
173 See id. The Court plainly infers that some test-most probably the economic
reality test-is necessary to evaluate instruments that are not as easily classified as
traditional stock. See id. In fact, the Landreth majority stated that " 'stock' is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to consistent definition. . . . Unlike
some instruments, therefore, traditional stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach." Id.
174 See id.; see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982) (stating
that "[t]he definition of security in the 1934 Act provides that an instrument which
seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be considered a security if
the context otherwise requires").
168
169
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dreth and Ruefenacht holdings will receive widespread application
or whether they will be confined to a narrow set of fact patterns.
Indeed, the sale of the businesses in Landreth and Ruefenacht included many unique elements that characterize classic investment purchases. In both cases, the business was marketed as an
investment with a forecast of future profits and earnings. 17 5 In
addition, the Landreth stock was offered for sale through out-ofstate brokers and was therefore not offered primarily to a local
market.' 76 Furthermore, the seller in both cases stayed on in 7a7
managerial capacity so that control was not clearly transferred.1

Finally, the purchaser in both cases was not previously involved
in a similar business. 78 Thus, there is considerable doubt as to
whether these purchases were for an entrepreneurial purpose or
for investment. It is surprising that the Supreme Court, in deciding Landreth and Ruefenacht, failed to recognize that many sales of
businesses do not present all of the hallmark elements of an investment that these cases do. This oversight is probably attributable to the Court's overwhelming desire to provide certainty and
uniformity in situations where the application of the Securities
Acts is in question.
The Landreth and Ruefenacht decisions represent yet another
step in the Supreme Court's uphill battle to provide uniform application of the Securities Acts. Although the Court makes a
compelling argument for the rejection of the sale-of-business
doctrine, Justice Stevens's dissent convincingly asserts that the
debate regarding the doctrine's application is not yet settled. In
fact, Justice Stevens states quite persuasively "that the interests
in certainty and predictability that are associated with a simple
'bright-line' rule are not strong enough to justify expanding liability to reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legislature's concern.' ""',Additional judicial explanation is required

before it will be clear whether these holdings will be limited to
175 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2300; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2309.

See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2300.
177 See id. at 2301; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2309. In Ruefenacht, only 50% of the
stock was transferred, and the seller maintained complete control and the power to
veto the purchaser's actions. Id. at 2309-10.
178 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984)
(none of the investors "had any knowledge of the lumber industry"), rev 'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2297 (1985); Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2309-10 (Ruefenacht remained a full-time
employee of another corporation).
179 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2313 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982)).
176
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their own facts or whether they will truly act to eliminate the saleof-business doctrine from the purview of existing securities law.
Elfriede Fisch

